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Abstract 
The Draft Convention on Crimes against Humanity is a welcome 
initiative.  To ensure that the Convention will reflect developments 
under international law since the 1990’s, it is suggested to reconsider 
the Draft Convention’s methodology of relying exclusively on the 
definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.  It is therefore proposed to view the 
Rome Statute’s list of crimes as a benchmark for negotiations rather 
than as the ultimate text defining what constitutes crimes against 
humanity. 
In that context, the article advocates for introducing in the Draft 
Convention a new crime against humanity addressing widespread or 
systematic attacks against cultural heritage. Such attacks have 
unfortunately become a rampant phenomenon in both times of war and 
peace.  In recent decades, a significant evolution in this field has taken 
place, including in the discourse equating heritage with humanity and 
heritage destruction with attacks against humankind; the jurisprudence 
of international tribunals; and the role exercised by bodies such as the 
Security Council in support of heritage protection.  Notwithstanding 
those developments, the legal framework governing atrocity crimes has 
not evolved in a commensurate manner. Consequently, certain legal 
gaps persist and the expressive value of counter-messaging large-scale 
campaigns of destruction has not been fully explored.  
The article begins with a brief overview of the contemporary 
international criminal law regime governing attacks against cultural 
heritage.  It continues by identifying the main legal gaps as well as 
additional considerations that support the introduction of a distinct 
crime against humanity in the Draft Convention’s list of crime.  The 
article then defines the proposed new crime and analyzes the crime’s 
elements including a definition of cultural heritage for the purpose of 
the Draft Convention.  
I. Introduction 
In 2001, the Taliban stunned the international community by 
destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas,2 two monumental statues carved into 
the cliffs of the Bamiyan valley in Afghanistan around the 5th century.3 
 
2. Ahmed Rashid, After 1,700 Years, Buddhas Fall to Taliban Dynamite, 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 12, 2001), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/132606
3/After-1700-years-Buddhas-fall-to-Taliban-dynamite.html 
[https://perma.cc/VD6D-3LWJ]. 
3. Id.  
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This abominable act was part of a widespread Taliban-led campaign of 
destruction of important cultural relics, a phenomenon often referred to 
as iconoclasm.4 
Statements, declarations, and resolutions adopted following the 
destruction highlighted the impact of such acts on humankind and the 
international community as a whole.5 Similar reactions followed the 
attacks carried out by terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Ansar 
Dine.6 Thus, for example, in the context of the Al Mahdi case before 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which addressed destruction 
by Ansar Dine of cultural heritage in Timbuktu, Mali, the ICC 
Prosecutor noted that “[T]he destruction of religious and historical 
World Heritage sites in Timbuktu appears to have shocked the 
conscience of humanity,”7 and the Court stated that the destruction of 
international cultural heritage “is an irreplaceable loss that negates 
humanity.”8 
Notwithstanding the evolution in the discourse equating heritage 
with humanity and heritage destruction with attacks against 
humankind, the legal framework governing atrocity crimes has not 
evolved in a commensurate manner. Under international criminal law 
(ICL), destruction of cultural heritage has remained within the confines 
of traditional categories, notably as a war crime, as a form of the crime 
 
4. Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of 
Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 183, 
192 (2003) (defining iconoclasm as the “destruction of icons due to the 
belief that the images are imbued with an unacceptable symbolic 
significance”).  
5. Cf. UNESCO, Resolution on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of 
Afghanistan, Doc. No. WHC-01/CONF.208/23, at 12 (Oct, 30–31, 2001) 
(adopted by the General Assembly of State Parties to the World Heritage 
Convention at its thirteenth session) (condemning the willful destruction 
of the cultural heritage by the Taliban as “crime[s] against the common 
heritage of humanity”). See also Wangkeo, supra note 4; Roger O’Keefe, 
World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as 
a Whole?, 53 Int’l  Comp. L. Q. 189, 200, n. 76 (noting that the United 
States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, decried the demolition of the 
Buddhas as “a crime against humankind”).  
6.  See, e.g., Anissa Barrak, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi: “I Plead Guilty”, 
UNESCO COURIER, at 18 (Oct.–Dec. 2017).  
7. Int’l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali, Article 53(1) 
Report, ¶ 157 (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan20
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BHC-ZKPJ].  
8. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 
Reparations Order, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17, 2017), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05117.PDF [https://perma.cc/KFU7-
AGTA]. 
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against humanity of persecution, or an indicator of a genocidal act.9 
Consequently, certain legal gaps persist, for instance where acts of 
destruction committed during peacetime do not target an identifiable 
group and hence do not amount to the crime of persecution.  
Moreover, the current legal regime is based on a conservative 
paradigm viewing crimes against cultural heritage as crimes against 
property,10 whereas a more nuanced approach would place such crimes 
at the intersection between crimes against property and crimes against 
people. Existing law also fails to reflect recent developments such as 
the interventions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
support of heritage protection, and it ignores the expressive value of 
counter-messaging the iconoclasm phenomenon.11  
Criminalization has therefore lagged behind the rhetoric and has 
failed to recognize attacks against cultural heritage as an independent 
crime with severe impact on the international community, indeed as a 
crime against humanity.  
The negotiations of the Draft Convention on Crimes against 
Humanity12 serve as an opportunity to close the gap. To that end, this 
article proposes to reconsider the Draft Convention’s methodology of 
relying exclusively on the definition of crimes against humanity under 
the Rome Statute of the ICC,13 and to view the Rome Statute’s list of 
crimes as only a benchmark for negotiations. It further suggests 
introducing a new crime against humanity dedicated to attacks against 
cultural heritage.  
The article begins with a brief overview of the contemporary ICL 
regime governing attacks against cultural heritage. It continues by 
identifying the main legal gaps and additional considerations that 
support the recognition of such attacks as a stand-alone crime against 
humanity. The article then defines the proposed new crime and analyzes 
the crime’s elements including a definition of cultural heritage for the 
purpose of the Draft Convention.  
II. The contemporary international criminal law regime governing 
attacks against cultural heritage 
 
9.  See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime 
Against Property or a Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL R. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 336, 346 (2016). 
10. Id. at 381.  
11. See UN Security Council Adopts Historic Resolution for the Protection 
of Heritage, UNESCO (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://en.unesco.org/news/security-council-adopts-historic-resolution-
protection-heritage [https://perma.cc/8QQR-ZCSP]. 
12. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-Fourth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/74/10, at 11–140 (2019) [hereinafter Draft Convention].  
13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
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Under ICL, accountability for crimes affecting cultural heritage14 is 
chiefly provided for under the respective rubrics of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.15 Whereas the former category provides 
‘direct protection’ by explicitly criminalizing conducts targeting 
cultural heritage,16 the latter provides only ‘indirect protection’17 as 
currently no crime against humanity mentions cultural heritage. Under 
the third rubric of ICL, namely that of genocide, “cultural genocide” is 
not, by itself, recognized as falling within the crime’s definition under 
the Genocide Convention18 or the statutes of international tribunals.19  
 
14. Different conventions and other legal instruments use the terms “cultural 
property,” “cultural heritage,” or, in some cases, both. It appears that the 
term “cultural property” is more legalistic, and is usually associated with 
tangible property, whereas “cultural heritage” is more encompassing and 
includes also intangible heritage. It was noted that the word “heritage” 
“has come to be preferred because it implies that the object should be 
cherished and preserved.”  See Wangkeo, supra note 4, at 188; see also 
Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural 
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 307, 312 (1992) 
(concluding that it is time for law and lawyers to recognize that the term 
“cultural heritage” has rightfully superseded that of “cultural property”). 
The approach that opts for the use of the term “cultural heritage” is also 
reflected in the more recent conventions adopted under the auspices of 
UNESCO, namely those governing underwater cultural heritage (2001), 
intangible cultural heritage (2003), and the diversity of cultural 
expressions (2005). For the purpose of this article, the preferred term 
would be “cultural heritage,” though the term “cultural property” will be 
occasionally used, in particular where conventions which use this term are 
referenced.  
15. Roger O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property Under International 
Criminal Law, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 339, 341 (2010) [hereinafter 
O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property].  
16. See Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed 
Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 10–28 (2001) (discussing 
the differences between “direct” and “indirect” protection). 
17. See id.  
18. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N. G.A. Res. 
260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948).  
19. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (pointing out that “where there 
is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks 
on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group 
as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an 
intent to physically destroy the group”); O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural 
Property, supra note 15, at 388–89.. 
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A. Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as War Crimes 
Attacks against cultural heritage in the context of an armed conflict 
(be it of an international or non-international character) are considered 
as a serious violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and fall 
within the jurisdiction of some international tribunals.20 The seriousness 
of the crime has been recognized by the ICTY21 and more recently by 
the ICC in the Al-Mahdi case.22  
Notably, while cultural heritage may enjoy the general protection 
provided to civilian property under IHL, it has been recognized that 
during an armed conflict, cultural heritage is also granted an additional 
layer of protection.23 Within the category of protected cultural heritage, 
certain designated heritage enjoy ‘special protection’ or ‘enhanced 
protection’ during an armed conflict,24 though it appears that even the 
 
20. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8, ¶ 2; Updated Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 3, Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), available at 
https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_199
3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/75HM-CPQF] [hereinafter ICTY Statute].  
21. See Abtahi, supra note 16; see Theodor Meron, The Protection of the 
Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict Within the Case-
Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Remarks at the UNESCO Symposium On The 50th Anniversary Of The 
1954 Convention For The Protection Of Cultural Property In The Event 
Of Armed Conflict (May 14, 2004); Serge Brammertz et al., Attacks 
Against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War: Prosecutions at the 
ICTY, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1143 (2016).  
22. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, 
ICC Office of the Prosecutor and UNESCO Sign Letter of Intent to 
Strengthen Cooperation on the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Nov. 6, 
2017), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171106_OTP_Unesco 
[https://perma.cc/34FH-23ZG]. 
23. Cf. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 89–90 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Meron, supra 
note 21, at 5 (describing the choice of the ICTY to address attacks against 
cultural property through Art. 3(d) of the ICTY Statute rather than Art. 
2(d), which concerns extensive destruction and appropriation of general 
civilian property, and noting that this preference of the Tribunal “may, 
therefore, be viewed as a welcome development from the standpoint of 
safeguarding cultural property, because it affords that property a higher 
degree of protection”); Brammertz et al., supra note 21, at 1152–53 
(explaining that “Article 3(d) ICTY Statute is a more specific crime 
addressing attacks against cultural property as a subset of civilian objects, 
reflecting the recognition that cultural property has significance 
additional to other civilian objects”).  
24. See The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 
1954 Convention]; The Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the 
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more elevated level of protection does not grant absolute immunity 
from an attack.25  
B. Attacks Against Cultural Property as a Crime Against Humanity of 
Persecution 
The Nuremberg Charter and the ensuing trials, where German 
Nazis were convicted for plunder, are considered the first true 
international enforcement of protection of cultural property.26 The 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg held that the 
unlawful destruction and plunder of cultural property amounted not 
only to war crimes but also to crimes against humanity.27  
 
protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 
1999 [hereinafter 1999 Protocol].  
25. Under existing IHL, all types of cultural heritage – including sites of the 
greatest importance to humanity, would be subject to the military 
necessity doctrine and hence would not enjoy absolute immunity in the 
context of an armed conflict. Both the “special protection” regime of the 
1954 Convention and the “enhanced protection” regime of its 1999 
Protocol enable parties to an armed conflict to invoke the military 
necessity exception, though subject to stricter conditions. See 1954 
Convention, supra note 24, art. 11; 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 13. 
With regard to the negotiations over the latter, some Parties to the 
Convention expressed the view that a small number of cultural properties, 
due to their exceptional value, should remain untouched in any 
circumstances; this view, however, was not favored by the majority. See 
ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED 
CONFLICT 271 (2006). Under the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, the provisions relevant to the protection of cultural 
heritage do not make a reference to any waiver of immunity; however, 
these provisions are stated to be without prejudice to the 1954 
Convention. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 16, June 8, 1977, 1125 
UNTS 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). As noted by the ICTY Trial 
Chamber, “this suggests that in these respects, the Additional Protocols 
may not have affected the operation of the waiver provision of the Hague 
Convention of 1954 in cases where military necessity imperatively requires 
waiver.” Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 309 (Jan. 31, 2005); see also Brammertz et al., supra note 
21, at 1156–57.  
26. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW I 949, 954 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2nd ed. 1999).  
27. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 
41 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 172, 249 (1947); see also O’Keefe, Protection of 
Cultural Property, supra note 15, at 380.  
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The ICTY, in a series of decisions, has concluded that destruction 
of or extensive damage to cultural heritage, when perpetrated with 
discriminatory intent, can, as a matter of customary international law, 
amount to the crime against humanity of persecution under Article 5(h) 
of the ICTY Statute.28  
Though the ICC has not yet rendered a similar decision, it is worth 
noting that the crime of persecution under the Rome Statute and the 
Draft Convention is broader than that of the ICTY Statute.29 It also 
covers persecution on cultural grounds as well as other grounds that 
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.30 
In principle, it appears that acts against cultural heritage akin to those 
which served as a basis for prosecution before the ICTY would likely 
be considered as persecution also under the Rome Statute and similarly 
under the Draft Convention.31   
III. The Main Legal Gaps 
A. Destruction of Cultural Heritage During Peacetime 
Notwithstanding the significant developments in relation to the 
protection of cultural heritage during peacetime,32 aspects of 
enforcement and criminal sanctions have been relatively less developed 
in comparison to the legal regime governing wartime illegal activities. 
Whereas IHL conventions and statutes of international tribunals 
explicitly provide for individual criminal responsibility for attacks 
against cultural heritage during an armed conflict,33 there is currently 
no international treaty that criminalizes similar acts committed outside 
the scope of an armed conflict.  Only two of the main conventions that 
apply in peacetime, namely the 1970 Convention and the 2001 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, make a general reference to 
 
28. See generally, O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 15; 
Brammertz et al., supra note 21, at 1160–70.   
29. See generally, O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 15; 
Brammertz et al., supra note 21; see also Draft Convention, supra note 
12, at 12.  
30. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(h); Draft Convention, supra note 
12, at 12.  
31. But note some differences between the ICTY Statute, on the one hand, 
and the Rome Statute and the Draft Convention, on the other, notably 
the required link under the Rome Statute between the crime of 
persecution and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
mentioned in the following section. See THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 375–76 (Cassesse et 
al. eds., 2002).  
32. See discussion infra Section IV(E)(1).  
33. 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15; Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 
8(2)(b)(ix); ICTY Statute, supra note 20, art. 3(d). 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity 
295 
the imposition of sanctions for violations of the conventions.34 
Currently, no convention details the offences to be incorporated under 
national law in a manner similar to the one provided for under the 1999 
Protocol.35 The 2017 Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating 
to Cultural Property aimed at addressing this gap by listing offences to 
be incorporated in national legislation.36 However, as of today, the 
Convention is yet to enter into force.37  
Under customary international law, crimes against humanity are 
banned whether they are committed in times of war or peace.38 
Considering that damage to cultural heritage can be deliberately 
inflicted without constituting a military attack, viewing destruction of 
cultural heritage as a crime against humanity would significantly 
contribute to bridging this gap by providing ‘direct protection’39 to 
cultural heritage in a manner similar to the protection provided under 
IHL.40 It will ensure a consistent criminalization approach,41 prevent 
 
34. See Convention on the Means Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 8, 
10, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S 231 [hereinafter 1970 Convention] 
(requiring State Parties to impose penalties or administrative sanctions 
on persons responsible for certain violations of the Convention); 
Convention of the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage art 17, 
Nov. 2, 2001, U.N.T.S. 2562.  
35. 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15.  
36. Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property 
art. 3–16, May, 19, 2017, 19 E.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Nicosia Convention].  
37. Id. 
38. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 356; Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 
13.  
39. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity Sixty-Seventh 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 6 (Feb. 17, 2015) (“While some 
treaties address offences, such as State-sponsored torture or enforced 
disappearance of persons, which under certain conditions might also 
constitute crimes against humanity, those treaties do not address crimes 
against humanity as such.”).  
40. See generally 1999 Protocol, supra note 24. 
41. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime 
Against Property or a Crime Against People? 15 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 390 (2016) (“The failure in the past to recognize 
this obligation to protect cultural heritage was largely the result of the 
bifurcation of the treatment of cultural heritage between the law of armed 
conflict treaties and those that deal with peacetime threats. This false 
dichotomy needs to be superseded.”). See also Michael A. Newton & 
Michael P. Scharf, Terrorism and Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING 
A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 262–78 (Leila Nadya 
Sadat, ed., 2011) (arguing that expanding the corpus of crimes against 
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impunity for acts such as the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, and 
align ICL with the customary norm concerning the protection of 
cultural heritage.42 
B. Legal Challenges in Invoking the Crime of Persecution 
Despite the ICTY’s wealth of jurisprudence addressing attacks 
against cultural heritage as a form of persecution, invoking this crime 
as a basis for prosecution requires surmounting legal hurdles. First, 
under both the Draft Convention and the Rome Statute, the acts of 
persecution must have been committed in connection to another crime 
against humanity, genocide or war crime.43 Thus, there is no jurisdiction 
to prosecute persecution per se.44 It has been argued that, in practical 
terms, the requirement should not prove unduly restrictive, since a 
review of historical acts of persecution shows that this crime is 
inevitably accompanied by such inhumane acts.45 However, while that 
argument may be accurate in cases of crimes such as murder or torture, 
it appears to be less persuasive in reference to destruction of cultural 
heritage.46 A systematic and deliberate destruction of sites of unique 
cultural value, conducted by a government outside the scope of an 
armed conflict, may not necessarily be in conjunction with any other 
serious international crime, thus these acts may go unpunished.  
In addition, the ICTY determined that the mens rea element of the 
crime of persecution is higher than the one required for ordinary crimes 
against humanity, although lower than the one required for genocide.47 
If this approach is adopted by the ICC or by a court applying the Draft 
Convention (once adopted and entered into force), the already elevated 
threshold for prosecuting crimes against humanity will be higher still.  
 
humanity to include terrorism could provide a harmonized legal 
framework applicable both in times of armed conflict and peace).   
42. See discussion infra Section IV(E)(1).  
43. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(h); Draft Convention, supra note 
12, art. 2(1)(h). 
44. It is not necessary, however, to demonstrate that the connecting crime 
was committed on a widespread or systematic basis: any instance of 
another criminal act under the Rome Statute will suffice, even if it does 
not amount to a crime against humanity in its own right. See Darryl 
Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 
93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 43, 53–55 (1999).  
45. Id. at 55.  
46. See generally, id. 
47. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 636, 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Abtahi, supra 
note 16, at 28.  
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Most importantly, by its very definition persecution targets an 
identifiable group or collectivity.48 However, iconoclastic acts target 
cultural relics due to the message they convey (in the eyes of the 
perpetrator) and often in defiance of values respected by the 
international community, not necessarily with an intent to affect any 
particular group which cherishes the icons for religious or other 
reasons.49  
Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that the three prime 
examples of large scale acts of iconoclasm committed in the past 20 
years by terrorist groups--namely by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and Ansar Dine in Mali--were intended 
to target an identifiable group or collectivity as such.50  
For example, when Ansar Dine took over Timbuktu, its leaders 
reportedly announced that “not a single mausoleum will remain in 
Timbuktu”, explaining that “Allah doesn’t like it”.51 As later described 
by Al Mahdi in an interview conducted following his conviction by the 
ICC, the mission of the Ansar Dine group which he was heading was 
to combat all acts that, in the group’s view, contravened the precepts 
of Islam.52 As he explained, the group considered the mausoleums of 
Timbuktu to be the incarnation of such acts of heresy.53   
Though those acts of destruction undoubtedly affected the local 
community of Timbuktu, as was also recognized by the ICC in the Al 
Mahdi Reparations Order, it does not appear that the acts were 
conducted with the discriminatory intent to target the local community 
 
48. The crime, as defined under both the Rome Statute and the Draft 
Convention, concerns “Persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity.’’ The term “persecution” is defined under the Rome Statute 
and the Draft Convention as “the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity 
of the group or collectivity.” Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2)(g); 
Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(2)(g).  
49. See Filipa Vrdoljak, The Criminalisation of the International Destruction 
of Cultural Heritage, in FORGING A SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS (Tiffany Bergin & Emanuela Orlando eds., 2017) 
(“Often the monuments, sites and shrines are not directly related to the 
cultural and religious practices of present-day inhabitants; instead, they 
are evidence of the multi-layered history and diversity of these sites. It is 
this cultural and religious diversity which the perpetrators find abhorrent 
and seek to expunge through such acts.”).  
50. Id.  
51. Timbuktu Mausoleums ‘Destroyed,’ BBC (Dec. 23, 2012), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20833010 
[https://perma.cc/2Z5S-AU2G].  
52. See Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi: “I plead guilty,” UNESCO, 
https://en.unesco.org/courier/2017-october-december/ahmad-al-faqi-al-
mahdi-i-plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/ARB7-QXQE]. 
53. Id.  
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or the broader population of Mali as such, namely as a form of 
persecution committed against these identifiable groups. 
Unsurprisingly, the prosecution in the Al Mahdi case decided early on 
to abandon the investigation of crimes against humanity, stating that 
the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe 
that crimes against humanity under Article 7 have been committed in 
the Situation in Mali.54 It is unlikely that the ICC-OTP’s decision 
derived from a conclusion that the acts themselves were not severe 
enough – after all, the ICTY recognized similar acts, sometimes against 
less known heritage,55 as amounting to persecution. Rather, it seems 
that the decision was based on the conclusion that the specific elements 
of the crime of persecution (or that of the crime of “other inhuman 
acts” as mentioned below) have not been met.56   
C. Legal Challenges in Invoking the Crime of “other inhuman acts of 
similar character”  
An alternative route for prosecuting perpetrators for crimes against 
humanity under the Rome Statute or the Draft Convention is found in 
the provision which criminalizes “other inhuman acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health.”57 This residual provision can 
potentially provide a solution to the problems discussed in reference to 
the crime of persecution such as the required connection to other crimes 
or the need to prove a discriminatory intent. 
Nonetheless, invoking this crime is not without difficulties. The 
crime’s vagueness and open-ended nature will require interpretation by 
 
54. Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) 
Report, ¶ 58, (Jan. 16, 2013), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan20
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RLL-6Q79].  But see Sebastian A. Green 
Martinez, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali, 13 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1073, 1074 (2015) (criticizing the ICC-OPT’s decision not to 
prosecute Al Hahdi for the crime of persecution).  
55. The ICTY’s recognition that destruction against cultural heritage may 
amount to persecution was often based on widespread attacks against 
religious and cultural institutions that were not inscribed on any list of 
heritage of great importance and arguably would not have met the criteria 
for such inscription. In comparison, most sites in Timbuktu were inscribed 
on the World Heritage list at the time they were attacked. See generally, 
World Heritage List, UNESCO https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ 
[https://perma.cc/FPC6-7PN3].  
56. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2)(g); Draft Convention, supra note 
12, at 13. 
57. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(k); Draft Convention, supra note 
12, art. 2(1)(k).  
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courts on a case-by-case basis,58 and in that context might invite 
defense arguments on violation of fundamental principles of criminal 
law such as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege and the prohibition 
of ex post facto law.59   
To counter the arguments, it may be recalled that the crime of 
“other inhuman acts” has been a recognized crime against humanity 
since its incorporation into the Nuremberg Charter,60 and that 
confiscation, pillage and plunder of property were considered by the 
IMT as “other inhuman acts”.61 However, the convictions by the IMT 
focused on acts committed against a specific population62 (the Jewish 
one), and can therefore be viewed as a form of persecution against an 
identifiable group, even if this was not pronounced as such in the IMT’s 
judgements.  
It is also noteworthy that the residual crime speaks of ‘acts of a 
similar character’: Considering that all other crimes enumerated under 
Article 2 of the Draft Convention concern acts directly targeting human 
persons and often focus on a specific group of victims (e.g. a racial or 
ethnic group), crimes concerning cultural heritage, which impact the 
international community as a whole, might not be considered as ‘acts 
of similar character’.63 The combination of the above arguments entails 
that courts might be reluctant to accept a sufficiently broad 
 
58. Both the ICTY and the ICTR stressed that the decision whether the 
alleged perpetrator’s conduct rose to the level of inhumane acts should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case 
No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 
21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).  
59. See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Rome Statute and Captain 
Planet: What Lies between ‘Climate against Humanity’ and the ‘Natural 
Environment?,’ 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 269 (2009) (suggesting 
not to criminalize environmental wrongs by means of interpreting Article 
7(l)(k) of the Rome Statute in light of this principle). See also Newton & 
Scharf, supra note 41, at 275–76; Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 
22(2) (“The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not 
be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.”).  
60. Newton & Scharf, supra note 41, at 276  
61. Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. 
J. 171, 201 (1997).  
62. See generally, id. 
63. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 564–66, 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000)  (pointing out 
the difficulties in interpreting Article 7(1)(k) of the ICTY Statute in light 
of the application of the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation, according 
to which a general expression would cover actions similar to those 
specifically provided for).. 
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interpretation that recognizes attacks against cultural heritage as 
falling within the scope of Article 1(k).64 The aforementioned decision 
of the ICC-OTP not to prosecute Al Mahdi for crimes against humanity 
despite the recognition of the gravity of the crimes, supports the 
conclusion that this provision does not serve as an ideal legal basis for 
prosecution of serious crimes committed against cultural heritage.65 
D. Addressing State Responsibility 
One of the gaps derived from the absence of a global treaty on 
crimes against humanity is that of state responsibility, because the 
definition of crimes against humanity is uncertain and no 
compromissory clause exists to permit litigation before the 
International Court of Justice (or elsewhere) regarding their 
commission.66  
This shortcoming is evident in the context of crimes committed 
against cultural heritage: few legal instruments governing the 
protection of cultural heritage make an explicit reference to state 
responsibility67 or contain a settlement of dispute clause similar to 
Article IX of the Genocide Convention.68 Consequently, there have been 
few cases that addressed state responsibility in relation to attacks 
against cultural heritage,69 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
 
64. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(k). 
65. Martinez, supra note 54, at 1074.  
66. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Contextual and Historical Analysis of the 
International Law Commission’s 2017 Draft Articles for a New Global 
Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 685 
(2018).  
67. Contra 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 38 (“No provision in this 
Protocol relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the 
responsibility of States under international law, including the duty to 
provide reparation.”); UNESCO Res. 32 C/Res. 1517, at § VI (Oct. 17, 
2003) [hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Declaration] (“A State that 
intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures 
to prohibit, prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of 
cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is 
inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another international 
organization, bears the responsibility for such destruction, to the extent 
provided for by international law.”).  
68. Contra Underwater Cultural Heritage, supra note 35, at art. 25; U.N. 
Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, preamble (Oct. 
20, 2005), 
https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/passeport-
convention2005-web2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K44B-48W4] [hereinafter 
Cultural Diversity Convention].  
69. A noteworthy exception is the case of “the Stela of Matara,” where a 
Claims Commission adjudicated a dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
The case concerned the destruction of an obelisk that is perhaps about 
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has not been utilized for cases of heritage destruction which were 
previously recognized by international criminal tribunals (e.g. the 
attacks against Dubrovnik addressed by the ICTY) in a manner similar 
to the cases it adjudicated in relation to genocidal acts.70      
This deficiency as well as the one identified in the previous section, 
namely the relative lack of criminal sanctions in the conventions 
governing protection of cultural heritage during peacetime, can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that cultural heritage conventions and other 
instruments often focus on the creation of mechanisms to promote 
cultural heritage, for example through the World Heritage List of the 
1972 Convention Concerning Protection of World Cultural Property 
and Natural Heritage,71 rather than on addressing criminal or state-
sponsored illegal activity. Be that as it may, this weakness in the legal 
regime may expose cultural heritage to acts of destruction that may go 
unpunished and perpetuate impunity of perpetrators and lack of 
accountability of states.  
IV. Beyond the Legal Gaps: The Case for Recognizing 
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime 
Against Humanity 
The previous section identified a number of shortcomings under the 
contemporary international legal framework governing protection of 
cultural heritage including under the rubric of crimes against humanity. 
But beyond the need to address those legal gaps, there are additional 
convincing reasons to introduce, in the Draft Convention, a distinct 
crime against humanity related to attacks against cultural heritage.    
Indeed, the mere fact that unlawful conduct can be covered under 
existing criminal offences has not prevented the development of ICL 
through the recognition that such a conduct deserves its own definition 
as a crime. For example, heinous genocidal acts committed during 
WWII were prosecuted under the rubrics of war crimes and crimes 
 
2,500 years old and was of great historical and cultural value for Eritrea. 
The destruction was carried out by the Ethiopian armed forces that 
occupied part of Eritrea during the war between the countries. See J. 
Romesh Weeramantry, Prisoners of War (Eritrea v. Ethiopia), Eritrea’s 
Claim 17/Ethiopia’s Claim 4, Partial Awards: Central Front (Eritrea v. 
Ethiopia), Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22/Ethiopia’s Claim 2, Partial 
Awards, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 465, 465–72 (2005).  
70. See generally Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A 
Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2007).  
71. UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage art.17, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, 27 U.S.T. 
37 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975) [hereinafter 1972 Convention].  
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against humanity as defined under the Nuremberg Charter.72 The main 
culprits were punished with the most severe penalties.73 Thus, from a 
strict legal perspective, there was no normative gap. Yet, following the 
war, the United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] passed a resolution 
recognizing genocide as a separate international crime,74 and the 
Genocide Convention was adopted shortly afterwards.75 
Notwithstanding the fact that genocidal acts could be punished using 
other legal formulas, genocide was introduced as a new term and as a 
distinct crime, inter alia to convey the notion of “never again”.76 
In the same vein and as already noted,77 attacks against cultural 
heritage committed during armed conflicts are punishable under the 
general offences governing attacks against civilian property.78 
Nonetheless, IHL and corresponding ICL norms were developed to 
specifically address attacks against cultural heritage during armed 
conflicts, thereby underscoring the gravity of the criminal act.79  
In the context of the Draft Convention, the following points are 
worth noting upon considering a proposal to introduce a new crime 
related to cultural heritage. 
A. Aligning the Law with the Rhetoric  
One of the main features of crimes against humanity is their impact 
not just upon the immediate victims but also on all humanity.80 In that 
regard, the repercussions of cultural heritage destruction to humanity 
and the international community as a whole was recognized as early as 
1954, when the following statement was incorporated in the preamble 
of the 1954 Hague Convention: “Being convinced that damage to 
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to 
 
72. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention: From 
Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 35, 40–43 (2007).  
73. See generally, id.  
74. G.A. Res. 1st Sess., 55th plen. Mtg. at 96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/96 (Dec. 11, 
1946).  
75. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 18, at 277.  
76. See Mark A. Drumbl, Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention: 
The Power of a Word, 40 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 97, 114–16 
(2009) (discussing the expressive value in introducing the crime of 
genocide).   
77. See discussion infra Section II.   
78. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4.  
79. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv). 
80. Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), First 
Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 12 (Feb. 
17, 2015).  
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the cultural heritage of all mankind.”81 In relation to that statement, 
the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights noted that 
“[W]hile specific aspects of heritage may have particular resonance for 
and connections to particular human groups, all of humanity has a link 
to such objects, which represent the “cultural heritage of all 
[hu]mankind,” to paraphrase the words of the 1954 Hague 
Convention.”82 The 1972 Convention also emphasized the importance 
of cultural heritage to humankind.83 
Similar statements were made on various occasions. Thus, for 
example, the 2003 UNESCO Declaration recalled “the tragic 
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan that affected the international 
community as a whole,”84 and defined ‘intentional destruction’ for the 
purpose of the Declaration as an act intended to destroy cultural 
heritage “in a manner which constitutes a violation of international law 
or an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of 
public conscience.”85 In the ICTY Jokic case, the Trial Chamber noted 
that “[T]he shelling attack on the Old Town [of Dubrovnik] was an 
attack not only against the history and heritage of the region, but also 
against the cultural heritage of humankind.”86 In the Al Mahdi case, 
the ICC Prosecutor stated that “[T]he loss was not locally confined. 
The magnitude of the loss of such irreplaceable physical embodiment 
 
81. 1954 Convention, supra note 24, preamble (emphasis added).  
82. Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), 
Remarks at the Human Rights Council Session 31, Panel: “Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage: Contextualizing the Human Rights Aspect with a View 
to Prevention or Mitigation,” 1–2 (Feb. 29, 2016) available at 
https://studylib.net/doc/17689335/human-rights-council-session-31 
[https://perma.cc/9Q4U-J7VK].  
83. Cf. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, at preamble (“Considering that 
deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural 
heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the 
nations of the world. [. . . .] Considering that parts of the cultural or 
natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be 
preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole.”). 
84. 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 67, preamble.  
85. Id. § II(2) (defining “intentional destruction” as “an act intended to 
destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage, thus compromising its 
integrity, in a manner which constitutes a violation of international law 
or an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of 
public conscience, in the latter case in so far as such acts are not already 
governed by fundamental principles of international law”) (emphasis 
added).  
86. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 
2004), available at 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HGK5-69DZ].  
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of history and culture was felt by the whole of humanity, and at the 
expense of future generations.”87 In its Judgement, the ICC Trial 
Chamber echoed this statement by noting that all the sites (but one) 
were UNESCO World Heritage sites and, as such, their attack appears 
to be of particular gravity as their destruction does not only affect the 
inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people throughout Mali and the 
international community.88 The Court maintained this approach in its 
Reparations Order, noting that “[T]he destruction of cultural heritage 
erases part of the heritage of all humankind.”89 In the 2011 Preah 
Vihear Case before the ICJ, Judge Cançado Trindade explained that 
“the ultimate titulaires of the right to the safeguard and preservation 
of their cultural and spiritual heritage are the collectivities of human 
beings concerned, or else humankind as a whole”.90  
The various statements all reflect an undisputable notion that links 
cultural heritage and humanity. Indeed, humanity comprises more than 
the sum of human beings, and is unique by the culture it has developed. 
Heritage bonds peoples and serves as the basis for the development of 
societies around the world.91 As was simply put by Gita Sahgal, the 
human rights activist, “heritage is humanity.”92  
 
87. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, Following Admission of Guilt by the Accused in Mali War 
Crime Case: “An Important Step for the Victims, and Another First for 
the ICC,” INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 24 2016), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160324-otp-stat-al-Mahdi 
[https://perma.cc/774Q-8K38]. 
88. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 80 (Sept. 27, 2016).  
89. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 
Reparations Order, ¶ 53 (Aug. 17, 2017).  
90. Request for Interpretation of the Judgement of 15 June 1962 in the Case 
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.), Separate 
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 2013 I.C.J. Reports 567, ¶ 114 (Nov. 
11).  
91. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, at preamble (“[State Parties to the 
Statute…] Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their 
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage . . . .”).  
92. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, ¶ 48, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/31/59, (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights. The Special Rapporteur 
reiterated this quote on March 10, 2016 in her Statement at the 31st 
session of the Human Rights Council, adding that “[Heritage] is a record 
of the genius of human beings, that which we leave behind for the next 
generations to mark our path through this world, and quite simply 
irreplaceable even in a digital world.” Karima Bennoune: Cultural 
Heritage is a Human Rights Issue, UNESCO (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://en.unesco.org/news/karima-bennoune-cultural-heritage-human-
rights-issue [https://perma.cc/E2AC-NHYB].  
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Attacks against cultural heritage are therefore attacks against the 
very foundations of humanity.93 In essence and by their definition they 
constitute crimes against humanity and therefore fall within the scope 
of the Draft Convention, which aims at protecting ‘humanity’ and not 
only ‘humans’. Inclusion of a dedicated crime concerning cultural 
heritage in the Draft Convention would therefore enable bridging the 
gap between the law and the long-standing rhetoric which has equated 
heritage with humanity.  
B. Counter-Messaging the “Bamiyanization Phenomenon” 
Iconoclasm is unfortunately not a new phenomenon.94 However, in 
the past 20 years, the international community has witnessed a new 
wave of deliberate destruction, combined with media campaigns of 
terrorist groups which spread the images as part of their strategy.95 The 
Taliban’s “success” in destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas has been 
replicated by ISIS in Palmyra and Ansar Dine in Timbuktu.96 As stated 
by the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, “[T]his 
represents a form of cultural warfare being used against populations, 
and humanity as a whole.”97 
Putting crimes against cultural heritage on par with other serious 
crimes would therefore be timely as it will convey an important counter-
message to those who intend to engage in iconoclasm. Similar reasoning 
 
93. See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-94-14/2-T, Judgment, 
¶ 207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 26, 2001), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7Y7K-7CTK] (holding that destruction of institutions 
dedicated to religion “amounts to an attack on the very religious identity 
of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion 
of ‘crimes against humanity,’ for all of humanity is indeed injured by the 
destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural 
objects”).  
94. See George Fitzherbert, Icon Smashing - The Precedents, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 10, 2001) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1211067.stm 
[https://perma.cc/V5GA-SW73]; see also Bennoune, supra note 84, at 3 
(“Unfortunately, there is a long human history of such acts in all regions 
of the world, whether in wars, revolutions or waves of repression.”).  
95. Nasir Behzad & Daud Qarizadah, The Man who Helped Blow up the 
Bamiyan Buddhas, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31813681 
[https://perma.cc/58AN-EGE3]; Benjamin Isakhan & Jose Antonio 
Gonzales Zarandona, Erasing History: Why Islamic State is Blowing up 
Ancient Artefacts, THE CONVERSATION (Jun. 4, 2017, 4:23 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/erasing-history-why-islamic-state-is-
blowing-up-ancient-artefacts-78667 [https://perma.cc/UW7H-QHUA]. 
96. Id.  
97. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, supra note 
94, ¶ 67. The Special Rapporteur reiterated this statement on February 
29, 2016, at her speech before the Human Rights Council. Id.  
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was invoked in instances where the international community decided 
to restore – to the extent possible – cultural heritage damaged or 
destroyed.98 Thus, for example, at the occasion of restoring the Mostar 
Bridge, UNESCO stated: “The old Bridge was destroyed for its 
symbolic value. It is for the same reason that UNESCO promised to 
rebuild it.”99 Similarly, in reference to the Bamiyan Buddhas, a 
UNESCO representative said: “The world should set an example to 
show extremists that today there are possibilities to reconstruct, and 
there is the will to reconstruct, such edifices after they are destroyed.”100  
The communicative and pedagogical aspect of punishment has been 
recognized as a key element of ICL.101 From an expressivist perspective, 
punishment strengthens faith in the rule of law among the general 
public and can impede the early indoctrination phases of future 
perpetrators.102 This aspect is particularly pertinent to confronting the 
radicalization and indoctrination campaigns characterizing terrorist 
groups such as ISIS.103   
Criminalization and providing a legal framework for international 
cooperation by including a specific crime against humanity in the Draft 
Convention would thus add a crucial dimension to the efforts of the 
 
98. Rob Smith, 3D-Printing is Helping to Restore the World’s Destroyed 
Heritage Sites, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/3d-modelling-is-helping-to-
restore-the-worlds-destroyed-heritage-sites/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ4V-
UCK4]. 
99. See Press Release, UNESCO, Inauguration of the Mostar Bridge (Jul. 16, 
2004), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=21743&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
[https://perma.cc/YBB4-FYRZ].  
100. Unlike the Mostar Bridge, the restoration of the Buddhas has been met 
with significant challenges which, to this date, prevent the 
restoration. See Babak Dehghanpisheh, Rebuilding the Bamiyan Buddhas, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2001, 6:39 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3067334/t/rebuilding-bamiyan-
buddhas/#.XQ-ZGsx7mP8 [https://perma.cc/N6CA-DCWT].  
101. See Drumbl, supra note 76, at 114–15. For a discussion on the symbolic 
function of ICL see Marina Aksenova, Conceptualizing Terrorism: 
International Offence or Domestic Governance Tool, 20 J. CONFLICT & 
SEC. L. 277, 296 (2015) (“The symbolic function of international criminal 
law refers to its mission of creating a space for shared, immutable values 
of the international community through the administration of exemplary 
justice.”).  
102. Id.  
103. Much has been written about ISIS’s methods of recruitment and 
indoctrination. For an analysis of this phenomenon from a social science 
perspective, see Trevor Hawkins, “A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS 
Indoctrination and Recruitment,” Capstone Projects and Master’s Theses 
(2016), available at https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes_all/7 
[https://perma.cc/7NMC-A4QJ].  
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international community to combat iconoclasm and, more generally, to 
advance important goals of ICL.  
C. The Preventative Angle 
One of the main objectives of the Draft Convention is the 
prevention of crimes against humanity.104 This aspect is particularly 
important with regard to cultural heritage, which is distinguishable 
from other forms of property by its irreplaceable character. Various 
conventions, resolutions, and court decisions have highlighted this 
unique characteristic of cultural heritage. For example, the 1970 
Convention requires State Parties to take measures to the extent 
feasible to prevent “irremediable injury to the cultural heritage” of a 
requesting State.105 The preamble of the 1972 Convention speaks about 
the importance of “safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, 
to whatever people it may belong.”106 The UNGA Resolution adopted 
after the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas noted that “the 
destruction of the statues in Afghanistan, in particular of the unique 
Buddhist sculptures in Bamiyan, would be an irreparable loss for 
humanity as a whole.”107 In the ICTY Jokic case, which concerned the 
attack against the old town of Dubrovnik, a UNESCO Heritage Site, 
the Court noted that “Restoration of buildings of this kind, when 
possible, can never return the buildings to their state prior to the attack 
because a certain amount of original, historically authentic, material 
will have been destroyed, thus affecting the inherent value of the 
buildings.”108 Similarly, in the Al Mahdi case, the Court stated: 
“Because of their purpose and symbolism, most cultural property and 
cultural heritage are unique and of sentimental value. As a result, they 
 
104. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 26 (“The present draft articles have 
two overall objectives: the prevention and the punishment of crimes 
against humanity.”). Though the title of the Draft Convention does not 
mention the term “prevention”— in comparison to the Genocide 
Convention—the preventative angle is emphasized throughout the Draft 
Convention. See id. at preamble (“Determined to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes”); id. art. 1 (“The present draft articles apply 
to the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity”); id. art. 
4. See also Sadat, supra note 66, at 700 (“A core pillar of the Initiative’s 
work on crimes against humanity concerned the potential preventive 
dimension of a new treaty.”).  
105. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 9 (emphasis added).  
106. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, preamble (emphasis added).  
107. G.A. Res. 55/243, preamble (May 1, 2001) (emphasis added).  
108. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 
2004).  
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are not fungible or readily replaceable. The destruction of international 
cultural heritage… is an irreplaceable loss that negates humanity.”109 
The importance of preserving unique cultural heritage led the 
drafters of conventions in this domain to focus on preventative 
measures that State Parties must take to protect cultural heritage. For 
example, to safeguard cultural heritage against the foreseeable effects 
of an armed conflict, the 1999 Protocol provides that State Parties shall 
take, as appropriate, preparatory measures such as the preparation of 
inventories and the preparation for the removal of movable cultural 
property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such 
property.110 The 1970 Convention, which, as indicated by its title, 
centers on prevention of illicit trafficking of cultural property, 
prescribes for measures such as creating national services with qualified 
staff, passing laws and regulations governing import, export and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property, and establishing and keeping 
up to date a list of important cultural property which should not be 
exported.111 
The inclusion in the Draft Convention of a specific crime against 
humanity in relation to attacks against cultural heritage therefore 
corresponds to the preventative approach reflected in other conventions 
governing protection of cultural heritage as well as the preventative 
aspect of the Draft Convention. It can complement the efforts to 
prevent irreparable damage to cultural heritage and consequently to 
humanity. 
D. The Rome Statute as a Benchmark  
One possible argument against the inclusion of a distinct crime 
related to cultural heritage is the decision to rely on the Rome Statute 
as the sole and definitive basis for the substantive law of the Draft 
Convention. From the outset, the Draft Convention intended to track 
the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity, building 
upon the “Rome consensus.’112 The current draft reflects this approach: 
The preamble recalls “the definition of crimes against humanity as set 
forth in article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court”,113 and art. 2 of the Draft Convention (“Definition of Crimes 
against Humanity”) is taken almost verbatim from the Rome Statute.114  
 
109. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 
Reparations Order, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17, 2017).  
110. 1999 Protocol, supra note 36, art. 5.  
111. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 5.  
112. Sadat, supra note 66, at 696.  
113. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 11.  
114. Int’l Law Comm’n, Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee, 
Crimes Against Humanity, at 6 (May 22, 2019), 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2019_dc_ch
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This approach undoubtedly has merits, including practical ones: It 
avoids the need for lengthy negotiations over the substantive law, thus 
focusing on aspects of international cooperation (extradition, MLA 
requests, etc.) relevant for combating the crimes listed under art. 2 of 
the Draft Convention.115  
Yet, this position deserves reconsideration. A legislative 
methodology which is based on maintaining the scope and language of 
previous texts for the sake of consensus can create legal challenges for 
courts applying the law.116 For example, the war crimes introduced in 
relation to attacks against cultural heritage were based on the Hague 
Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land117 and 
consequently have a number of inherent shortcomings.118 In the Al 
Mahdi case, while no doubt arose with regard to his role in destroying 
cultural heritage, the conviction was criticized for not meeting all legal 
requirements defined under the Rome Statute.119  
 
airman_statement_cah.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY2W-PGEE] (“The text 
adopted on first reading essentially reproduced Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute in three consecutive paragraphs, except for three non-substantive 
changes, following a general agreement in the Commission that the 
definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Rome Statute 
should not be modified by the Commission in the context of the work on 
this topic.”).  
115. For a discussion of the various reasons that may support the use of the 
definition of the crimes as provided under the Rome Statute, see Darry 
Robinson, The Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity: What to 
Do with the Definition? (Queen’s Univ., Legal Research Paper No. 2015-
013, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2531530 [https://perma.cc/6J69-
9UA4], in ON THE DRAFT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY CONVENTION 103, 
103–33 (Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying eds., FICHL Publication Series 
No. 18, 2014).   
116. An example from a different domain is the definition of maritime piracy 
in Article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which 
merely duplicated previous texts and was criticized even before the 
Convention entered into force. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New 
“Jamaica Discipline”: Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 128 
(1990) (“Ironically, these piracy articles [in UNCLOS] perpetuate defects 
in response to maritime violence which . . . . could enable that ‘business’ 
to thrive.”).  
117. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land 
Convention art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 
Convention].  
118. See generally Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural 
Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the Rome Statute 
of the ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 857 (2005).  
119. See William Schabas, Al Mahdi Has Been Convicted of a Crime He Did 
Not Commit, 49 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 75, 101 (2017).  
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It is evident that the Rome Statute did not intend to create 
stagnation of ICL. Article 10 provides that “Nothing in this Part [Part 
II: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law] shall be interpreted 
as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of 
international law for purposes other than this Statute.”120 Article 7, 
which governs crimes against humanity, starts with the phrase ‘for the 
purpose of this Statute’, which entails that the definition of the crimes 
is “plainly intended only to be applicable before the International 
Criminal Court.”121 In relation to this provision it was also noted that 
it “represents both a ‘codification’ and a ‘progressive development of 
international law’ within the meaning of article 13 of the UN 
Charter.”122  
Interestingly, the drafters of the Draft Convention did not consider 
themselves bound by the text of the Rome Statute when addressing 
aspects other than the definition of the crimes.123 For example, they 
opted for a broader approach on accountability by introducing a 
requirement that States take measures, where appropriate, to establish 
the liability of legal persons.124 This welcome approach was adopted 
despite the drafters’ recognition that criminal liability of legal persons 
is still unknown in many States, that many conventions do not include 
this form of liability, and that this approach deviates from the statutes 
of most international criminal tribunals.125 
Importantly, the negotiations over the Draft Convention should not 
ignore the changes in the landscape on the international level since the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute in the 1990’s. Specifically with regard 
to cultural heritage and as will be elaborated below, there have been 
significant developments in recent decades which justify elevating the 
level of protection granted to cultural heritage and viewing widespread 
or systematic attacks against cultural heritage as crimes against 
humanity.  In conclusion, Article 7 of the Rome Statute should serve as 
 
120. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 10.  
121. See THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 159 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016) 
(emphasis in the original text).  
122. Id. at 155. See also Wattad, supra note 59, at 275–76 (explaining why the 
existing list of crimes under the Rome Statute is not a closed list and 
arguing that “. . . . criminal theory is a living institute. A particular 
crime’s definition, scope and substance change over time. The history of 
the evolution of the core crime is a living testimony on how the meanings 
of ‘war crime’ and ‘crimes against humanity’’ for example, have been the 
subject of serious changes and development throughout history”).  
123. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 22–23.  
124. Id. at 14.  
125. Id. at 73–75.  
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a benchmark for the Draft Convention, not as the ultimate text defining 
what constitutes crimes against humanity. 
E. Developments in the Past 20 Years in Relation to the Protection of 
Cultural Heritage 
The norms governing protection of cultural heritage has 
significantly developed since the 1990’s, when the Rome Statute was 
negotiated. There is little doubt today that attacks against cultural 
heritage may entail individual criminal responsibility126 and that the 
governing rules also apply to non-state actors.127 The following 
developments are particularly noteworthy.  
1. Attacks Against Cultural Property as Violation of Customary 
International Law 
It is by now firmly established that deliberate attacks against 
cultural heritage of great importance to humankind constitute a 
violation of customary international law,128 indeed of a norm of an erga 
omnes character.129 Iconoclasm of the type seen in Afghanistan, Syria, 
 
126. See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Madhi, ICC--01/12-01/15, 
Reparations Order (Aug. 17, 2017); Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic 
and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal, ¶ 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2005); 
UNESCO Declaration on the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note 
86, art. 7 (“States should take all appropriate measures, in accordance 
with international law, to establish jurisdiction over, and provide effective 
criminal sanctions against, those persons who commit, or order to be 
committed, acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great 
importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list 
maintained by UNESCO or another international organization.”).  
127. See G.A. Res. A/HRC/RES/33/20, preamble (Oct. 6, 2016) 
(“Recognizing also that addressing the destruction of tangible and 
intangible cultural heritage needs to be holistic, encompassing all regions, 
contemplating both prevention and accountability, focusing on acts by 
State and non-State actors in both conflict and non-conflict situations, 
and terrorist acts”); Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 383 (referring to the 
2003 UNESCO Declaration and noting that it applies to destruction 
committed by the governing authority within its own territory, as was 
the case with the Taliban in Afghanistan).  
128. Cf. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, supra 
note 92, ¶ 59 (concurring with experts that “‘the prohibition of acts of 
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of major value for humanity’ 
rises to the level of customary international law and is a norm which is 
supported by ‘a general opinio juris.’”).  
129. See Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 633–
34 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he first of these customary norms lies in the 
principle according to which cultural heritage constitutes part of the 
general interest of the international community as a whole. This principle 
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Iraq, and Mali has been strongly condemned by numerous states, 
attesting to their opinio juris in relation to such illegitimate acts.130 
Under IHL, the conclusion regarding the status of this norm is 
reinforced by the inclusion in the Rome Statute of attacks against 
certain types of cultural heritage as war crimes subject to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction as well as the wealth of ICTY’s jurisprudence. The norm 
applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts.131  
The norm against the peacetime destruction of cultural property 
has also evolved considerably. The 1972 Convention and the Intangible 
Heritage Convention, which created (respectively) the World Heritage 
List and the List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and 
which impose on Member States the duty to safeguard cultural heritage 
present in their territories,132 have by now practically universal 
membership.133 The 2003 UNESCO Declaration, adopted unanimously 
 
has its theoretical foundation in the concept of erga omnes obligations . . 
. .”).  
130. See Filippo Ristoldo, Attacks Against Cultural Property as a Weapon of 
War, 34 STUDENT PAPER SERIES 2, 9 (2016); Francesco Francioni, Beyond 
State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared 
Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1219 (2004) (discussing 
that an opinio juris regarding the unlawful character of destruction of 
cultural heritage also in peace time is emerging). 
131. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv) (stating that 
deliberate attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes and historic monuments are criminalized 
under the Rome Statute in both sections of international and non-
international armed conflicts); 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art. 19 
(applying the Convention to “conflicts not of an international character”; 
1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 22 (applying the Protocol to “armed 
conflicts not of an international character”; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case 
No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 230 (Jan. 31, 2005) 
(concluding that Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute, which criminalizes 
“seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated 
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and works of art and science,” is “a rule of international 
humanitarian law which not only reflects customary international law but 
is applicable to both international and non-international armed 
conflicts”). .  
132. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4; UNESCO, Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 11,  (Oct. 17, 2003), 
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
[https://perma.cc/8FL2-CTG5] [hereinafter Intangible Heritage 
Convention].  
133. See UNESCO, States Parties Ratification Status, 
https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ [https://perma.cc/85LY-
4WQK] (stating there are 193 parties to the 1972 Convention); UNESCO, 
The 2003 Convention Reaches 175 State Parties, 
https://ich.unesco.org/en/news/the-2003-convention-reaches-175-state-
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by UNESCO members following the destruction of the Bamiyan 
Buddhas, placed on equal footing the protection of cultural heritage 
during war and peace times.134 It has been therefore correctly argued 
that by extending similar protections to cultural heritage in the absence 
of armed conflict, destruction of cultural heritage during peacetime 
“moves beyond the status of a war crime to the level of a crime against 
humanity.”135 
This evolution, which supports the conclusion regarding the 
elevated status accorded to the norm prohibiting attacks against 
cultural heritage, is of importance for the purposes of the Draft 
Convention, considering that all crimes currently listed in Art. 2 are 
viewed as violations of customary international law.   
2. Security Council Resolutions 
Another important development is the growing recognition that 
attacks against cultural heritage may constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the meaning of the Charter of the 
United Nations. When the Taliban launched its campaign of 
destruction of cultural relics, culminating with the demolition of the 
Bamiyan Buddhas, various international bodies including the UNGA 
and UNESCO expressed their profound concerns.136 The UNSC’s voice, 
however, was not heard, though the Taliban was already subject to 
UNSC sanctions.137 At the time, some scholars explained that this was 
due to the fact that the destruction of cultural heritage in itself cannot 
be reasonably said to reach the threshold of a ‘threat’ under Article 39 
of the UN Charter.138  
 
parties-00255 [https://perma.cc/G9K7-NVYK] (stating there are 175 
parties to the Intangible Heritage Convention).  
134. UNESCO Declaration on the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note 
86, preamble (“Mindful of the development of rules of customary 
international law as also affirmed by the relevant case-law, related to the 
protection of cultural heritage in peacetime as well as in the event of 
armed conflict”) (emphasis omitted).  
135. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 383 (suggesting that “the Declaration 
may be considered to be an element or evidence of customary 
international law”).  
136. See G.A. Res. 53/165, ¶ 16 (Dec. 9, 1998) (“Expresses its deep concern 
at reports of attacks on and looting of cultural artefacts in Afghanistan . 
. . .”). Cf. U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
Doc. No. WHC-01/CONF.208/23, at 6 (Nov. 22, 2001) (describing 
UNESCO Press Release No. 2001-27).  
137. See S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4 (Oct. 15, 1999) (reaffirming “respect for 
Afghanistan’s cultural and historical heritage”).  
138. See Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 129, at 630.  
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Whether this conclusion was accurate when pronounced is 
debatable. During the discussion that took place at the UNGA following 
the destruction of the Buddhas, a number of delegates linked respect 
for cultural and religious differences to peace and stability in the 
world.139 In any event, the ensuing developments in the past (nearly) 
two decades suggest that the position expressed by those delegates has 
found broader support.  
Respect for cultural heritage has been frequently linked to the 
notion of peace and security. Thus, for example, the preamble of the 
Cultural Diversity Convention recalls that “cultural diversity, 
flourishing within a framework of democracy, tolerance, social justice 
and mutual respect between peoples and cultures, is indispensable for 
peace and security at the local, national and international levels”.140 
The UNGA has encouraged activities “aimed at promoting 
interreligious and intercultural dialogue in order to enhance peace and 
social stability”.141 The associative value of cultural heritage can also 
lead to disputes that may escalate into armed conflicts, hence 
threatening international peace and security. For example, the dispute 
between Cambodia and Thailand on sovereignty over the Preah Vihear 
Temple led, in 2008, to an exchange of fire between the armed forces of 
both countries.142 This required intervention by international bodies 
including a second round of discussions before the ICJ, which issued an 
order on provisional measures, demanding both countries to withdraw 
their military personnel from a “provisional demilitarized zone” 
surrounding the Temple.143  
Notably, various Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in the period 
that followed the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas attest to the 
significant evolution in relation to the nexus between protection of 
cultural heritage and the notion of international peace and security. In 
2003, the UNSC incorporated in the operative part of a Chapter VII 
 
139. See Wangkeo, supra note 4, at 259 n.632 (“The delegate from Mauritius 
believed that international peace and security was ‘based on this fabric of 
understanding and mutual respect between nations, as well as respect for 
the religions and cultures of all the peoples of the world’ [. . . .] Thailand 
implied the same by counting cultural diversity as a bedrock of the United 
Nations and its institutions.”).  
140. Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 68, preamble. As of May 2020, 
the Convention has 148 State Parties. See Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&language=E
&order=alpha [https://perma.cc/M6CR-PFUB].  
141. G.A. Res. 73/129 (Dec. 20, 2018) (emphasis added).  
142. See Q&A: Thailand-Cambodia Temple Dispute, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12378001 
[https://perma.cc/V7ZD-AU52]. 
143. See Camb. v. Thai., 2011 I.C.J. at 554.  
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Resolution instructions to all UN Member States to take steps to 
facilitate the return of Iraqi cultural property to Iraqi institutions, 
including by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of 
artefacts.144 In a series of Chapter VII Resolutions, adopted since 2012 
in the context of the situation in Mali, the UNSC first recalled that 
destruction of cultural and religious sites may amount to crimes under 
the Rome Statute.145 It included, for the first time, protection of cultural 
heritage in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation,146 thus putting it 
on par with several other humanitarian and civil protection goals, 
including humanitarian assistance and promotion and protection of 
human rights.147 In another novel Resolution, the UNSC also included 
the possible imposition of sanctions in relation to attacks against 
cultural heritage.148  
In parallel, and acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC condemned 
the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic 
State and the Al-Nusra Front, and noted with concern the established 
links between the looting and smuggling of cultural heritage and the 
financing of terrorism.149  
This evolution on the UNSC level culminated with the unanimous 
adoption in March 2017 of UNSC Resolution 2347, entirely dedicated 
to the protection of cultural heritage.150 In this Resolution, the UNSC 
 
144. See S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 7 (May 22, 2003).  
145. See S.C. Res. 2071 (Oct. 12, 2012); Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 385 
(describing Resolution 2100, made a few months later, where the UNSC 
referred to the “destruction of cultural and historical heritage”, while 
omitting specific reference to religious sites, which are presumably 
subsumed within the categories of cultural and historical heritage, as a 
violation of international humanitarian law).  
146. S.C. Res. 2100 (Apr. 25, 2013). The Resolution, which established the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA), includes two aspects related to the protection of Cultural 
Heritage in MINMUSMA’s mandate: First, to assist the transitional 
authorities of Mali in protecting from attack the cultural and historical 
sites in Mali. Second, to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and 
historical sites. Cultural heritage preservation was thus put on par with 
several other humanitarian and civil protection goals, including 
humanitarian assistance and promotion and protection of human rights. 
See id. at ¶ 15(f).  
147. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 385.  
148.  S.C. Res. 2374 (Sept. 5, 2017). The Resolution established a new 
sanctions committee, which may designate individuals or entities that 
undermine the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by 
financing them through the proceeds from organized crime, including 
trafficking in drugs, human beings, arms, and cultural property. See id. 
at ¶ 9.  
149. See S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 15–16 (Feb. 12, 2015).  
150. See S.C. Res. 2347 (Mar. 24, 2017). 
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emphasized that the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage can fuel 
and exacerbate conflict and hamper post-conflict national 
reconciliation, thereby undermining the security and stability of 
affected States.151 Statements made by various representatives in the 
debate that preceded the adoption of the Resolution all underlined the 
importance attached to the protection of cultural property as a security 
imperative.152 For example, the British Ambassador highlighted the 
need to respond to cultural destruction “with the same intensity and 
the same unity of purpose as any other threat to international peace 
and security.” 153 The UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs 
noted that the protection of cultural heritage “is not only a cultural 
issue, it is also a security and humanitarian imperative.”154 
Hence, considering attacks against cultural heritage as potentially 
threatening peace and security is no longer a far-fetched concept. This 
conclusion is noteworthy in the context of the Draft Convention for two 
important reasons: First, since the preamble of the Draft Convention 
explicitly recognizes that crimes against humanity “threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world”.155 Thus, the list of crimes in 
Article 2 should include only those whose commission may indeed pose 
risks to peace and security. Second, in light of the fact that when the 
Rome Statute was negotiated there was relatively little support for this 
view,156 the evolution in the past 20 years therefore supports the call to 
reconsider the decision to include in Article 2 of the Draft Convention 
 
151. Id.  
152. See generally Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/Pv.7907 (2017) (detailing the 
debate between the representatives preceding the adoption of Resolution 
2347). 
153. Ambassador Peter Wilson, U.K. Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, Statement at the Security Council Briefing on Protecting 
Cultural Heritage (Mar. 24, 2017), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/what-were-witnessing-is-a-
systematic-and-corrosive-assault-on-history-on-religion-on-the-very-
fabric-of-identity [https://perma.cc/Z3UL-L4BH]. 
154. Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/Pv.7907, at 2 (2017); accord id. at 4 
(“defending cultural heritage is more than a cultural issue; it is a security 
imperative that cannot be separated from the protection of human lives”). 
See also  Kristin Hausler, Cultural Heritage and the Security Council: 
Why Resolution 2347 Matters (Mar. 31, 2018), available at 
http://www.qil-qdi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/02_UNSCCultural-
Heritage_Hausler_FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5C3-6XMN] (discussing 
Resolution 2347 and its impact).  
155. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 11. See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 13, at 91 (“Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world.”).  
156. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 889. 
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only the crimes identified in the 1990’s as meeting the threshold of 
crimes against humanity.    
3. The Al Mahdi Case: Recognizing the International Community as a 
Victim of Cultural Heritage Destruction  
The importance of cultural heritage to humankind has been 
considered as a factor when assessing the gravity of the crime.157 The 
Al – Mahdi case, which was innovative in a number of aspects, notably 
as the first case ever to focus exclusively on the war crime governing 
attacks against cultural property,158 was also groundbreaking in another 
dimension: In its Reparations Order, the Court decided to grant one 
symbolic euro to the international community.159  
The decision to recognize the international community as a victim 
in this case is well-founded on the facts, in particular the intention of 
the perpetrators to destroy heritage cherished by the world community. 
Various statements, made during and after the destruction of 
Timbuktu’s heritage, manifest that the acts of destruction were indeed 
aimed at the international community as a whole, as an act of defiance 
against the very meaning of civilization. One speaker on behalf of Ansar 
Dine told foreign reporters “from now on, as soon as foreigners speak 
of Timbuktu” they [Ansar Dine] would attack anything referred to as 
a World Heritage site,” adding that “[T]here is no world heritage, it 
doesn’t exist.”160 Similarly, Omar Hamaha, the military chief of Ansar 
 
157. Cf. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 
2004) (“The Trial Chamber finds that, since it is a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law to attack civilian buildings, it is a crime 
of even greater seriousness to direct an attack on an especially protected 
site, such as the Old Town, constituted of civilian buildings and resulting 
in extensive destruction within the site.”). See also Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 80 
(Sept. 27, 2016) (“Furthermore, all the sites but one (the Sheikh 
Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum) were UNESCO World 
Heritage sites and, as such, their attack appears to be of particular gravity 
as their destruction does not only affect the direct victims of the crimes, 
namely the faithful and inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people 
throughout Mali and the international community.”)  
158. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 387 (“This prosecution for cultural 
heritage destruction, divorced from attacks on civilians and other civilian 
objects, moves the pendulum toward elevating the status of cultural 
heritage destruction as a crime. The Prosecutor emphasized the cultural, 
rather than solely the religious value, of the historic structures.”).  
159. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 
Reparations Order, ¶ 107 (Aug. 17, 2017).  
160. AFP, Mali Islamists Destroy Tombs at Ancient Timbuktu Mosque, Aʜʀᴀᴍ 
Oɴʟɪɴᴇ (July 10, 2012), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/47361/World/Internatio
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Dine, stated that this group “is showing the rest of world, especially 
Western countries, that whether they want it or not, we will not let the 
younger generation believe in shrines as God, regardless of what the 
U.N., UNESCO, International Criminal Court or ECOWAS [the 
Economic Community of West African States] have to say. We do not 
recognize these organizations.”161 As also presented during the Al Mahdi 
case, “Mr. Al Mahdi said himself during the Djingareyber Mosque 
attack: It’s probably the oldest mosque here in town, and is considered 
a heritage site […] a World Heritage Site. There are so many rumours 
relating to these shrines […]. Those UNESCO jackasses – this […] they 
think that this is heritage. Does ‘heritage’ include worshipping cows 
and trees?”162 During his trial, Al Mahdi stated “[I]’m really remorseful 
about what I had caused the international community as a whole.”163 
Viewing the international community as a victim, as enunciated for 
the first time by an international court with a concrete – even if 
symbolic – sanction, is certainly a turning point. Importantly, it has 
removed any doubt, if one ever existed, on the fact that all humankind 
is impacted by the destruction of cultural heritage. It thus also 
represents another step in aligning the law and practice with the long-
standing rhetoric on the importance of cultural heritage to humanity. 
The holding in the Al-Mahdi case has additional significant 
implications: Recognizing that the international community is a victim 
of destruction of cultural heritage also entails the possible application 
of all criminal jurisdiction paradigms – including universal jurisdiction 
– to cases of attacks against cultural heritage.164 This conclusion is 
pertinent in relation to the Draft Convention, which recalls that “it is 
the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction with respect 
to crimes against humanity”165, and obliges each state to “take the 
necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered 
by the present draft articles in cases where the alleged offender is 
 
nal/MaliIslamists-destroy-tombs-atancient-Timbuktu-m.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X5SX-S9SV].  
161. Julius Cavendish, Destroying Timbuktu: The Jihadist Who Inspires the 
Demolition of the Shrines, Tɪᴍᴇ (July 10, 2012), 
http://world.time.com/2012/07/10/destroying-timbuktu-the-jihadist-
who-inspires-the-demolition-of-the-shrines/ [https://perma.cc/FY3J-
XTZQ].  
162. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 46 (Sept. 27, 2016).  
163. Id. ¶ 70 (emphasis in original).  
164. See 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 535 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986) 
(discussing the application of criminal jurisdiction in the context of 
cultural heritage).  
165. Draft Convention, supra note 12, premable.   
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present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite 
or surrender the person in accordance with the present draft articles.”166   
4. Rethinking the Categorization of Crimes Against Cultural Heritage: 
The Intersection between Crimes Against Property and Crimes Against 
People 
Crimes affecting cultural heritage have traditionally been 
considered as falling within the category of crimes against property. It 
is probably one of the reasons – perhaps the focal one – for not viewing 
such conduct as an independent crime against humanity, bearing in 
mind that currently all the other crimes against humanity under the 
Draft Convention belong to the category of crimes against persons.167 
Despite various innovative aspects in the Al Mahdi case, this classic 
approach was maintained by the Court, which noted that “unlike other 
accused convicted by this Court, Mr. Al Mahdi is not charged with 
crimes against persons but with a crime against property. In the view 
of the Chamber, even if inherently grave, crimes against property are 
generally of lesser gravity than crimes against persons.”168 
This conservative position, however, seems to be at odds with the 
Court’s own findings, according to which the destruction of cultural 
heritage directed by Al Mahdi does not merely constitute attacks 
against property as such but also an affront to important values of 
humanity, enshrined in UNESCO’s Constitution.169  
Moreover, this approach fails to acknowledge important 
developments under international law, which point to a shift in the 
manner by which protection of cultural heritage is perceived. First, as 
argued as early as 2001, “[T]he ICTY’s prosecution of cultural property 
crimes is also significant because it blurred the traditional distinction 
between crimes against persons and crimes against property.”170 The 
rich ICTY jurisprudence that followed that statement confirms this 
conclusion. 171 
Importantly, there is a growing recognition of the human dimension 
of cultural heritage.172 This is manifested, for example, by the two most 
recent conventions adopted under the auspices of UNESCO, namely 
 
166. Id. art. 6(2).  
167. Id. art. 2.  
168. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 77 (Sept. 27, 2016).  
169. See id. ¶ 46.  
170. Abtahi, supra note 16, at 31.  
171. See id. (providing an analysis of the ICTY jurisprudence). 
172. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 
Reparations Order, ¶ 16 (Aug. 17, 2017) (“Cultural heritage is important 
not only in itself, but also in relation to its human dimension.”).  
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the 2003 Convention on Intangible Heritage and the 2005 Convention 
on Cultural Diversity.173 Both Conventions are centered on the links 
between cultural heritage and communities and even individuals.174 
These developments and shift of mindset place crimes against 
cultural heritage at the intersection between crimes against property 
and crimes against people. Where cultural heritage concerns tangible 
property such as historic monuments, the immediate target may be the 
particular property, yet the impact on the human dimension, indeed on 
humanity as a whole, cannot and should not be ignored. Where the 
target is intangible heritage, the human aspect is inevitably intertwined 
with such acts. Either way, cultural heritage destruction may no longer 
be considered as a simple loss of property.175 
V. The Offence 
In light of the foregoing discussion and for the purpose of the Draft 
Convention,176 it is proposed to define the new crime against humanity 
as follows: “Causing severe damage to cultural heritage.”177  
The proposed specific elements of the crime are: 1) the perpetrator 
caused severe damage to cultural heritage; 2) the perpetrator was aware 
of the factual circumstances that established the status of the heritage 
 
173. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 870 n.59 (detailing the status protecting 
cultural property was acknowledged in a UNESCO 2003 declaration).  
174. Intangible Heritage Convention, supra note 133, art. 2 (defining 
“intangible cultural heritage” as “the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills . . . . that communities, groups and, in some 
cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.”); Cultural 
Diversity Convention, supra note 70, art. 4(3) (“‘Cultural expressions’ are 
those expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, groups and 
societies, and that have cultural content.”).  
175. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 392 (“Cultural heritage destruction 
constitutes a crime against people, not simply a loss of property.”); 
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda at the Opening of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing in the 
Case Against Mr Ahmad Al-Faqi Al Mahdi, Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cʀɪᴍ. Cᴛ. (Mar. 1, 
2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-
stat-01-03-16 [https://perma.cc/C5QZ-G9VR] (“Let us be clear: what is 
at stake is not just walls and stones. The destroyed mausoleums were 
important, from a religious point of view, from an historical point of view, 
and from an identity point of view.”).  
176. If the proposal is adopted and a new crime against humanity is introduced 
in the Draft Convention, it would also be recommended to introduce the 
new crime in the Rome Statute. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 881 (the 
“Rome Statute . . . . strives to represent the most comprehensive approach 
. . . . [and] ought to serve as the normative platform for the inclusion of 
new crimes”). 
177. Id. at 889–90.  
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targeted and intended that heritage to be severely damaged 
nonetheless.178 
With regard to the elements of the crime, the following points are 
noteworthy. 
A. The ‘Chapeau’ Elements 
The new proposed crime must meet the three overall requirements 
contained in art. 2 of the Draft Convention: Firstly, the acts must be 
committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic’ attack. This would 
generally exclude isolated or sporadic misbehavior, however heinous 
and revolting, from the scope of crimes against humanity.179 The attacks 
may occur in different locations and over a large geographical area, yet 
this is not required.180 Consequently, both acts of destruction of cultural 
heritage in a single town (e.g. Timbuktu) or in various locations (e.g. 
different sites across Syria and Iraq) may meet this requirement. As 
indicated by jurisprudence of international tribunals, the term 
‘systematic’ would usually connote an organized plan or policy.181 The 
authority behind the crimes may also be a non-state actor.182 Thus, a 
religious edict such as the fatwa issued by the Taliban in February 
2001, instructing the destruction of cultural heritage in Afghanistan,183 
may evidence the existence of an organizational plan or policy for the 
purpose of meeting the requirement of a ‘systematic attack’.184 
Secondly, the illegal conduct must be committed as part of an 
attack ‘directed against any civilian population.’ The expression 
‘directed against’ specifies that “in the context of a crime against 
 
178.  See id. at 884. 
179. Cassesse, supra note 31, at 356–57. But see Draft Convention, supra note 
12, at 34 (indicating that an “attack may be widespread due to the 
cumulative effect of multiple inhumane acts or the result of a single 
inhumane act of great magnitude.”); id. at 32–33 (noting in its 
commentary that “a single act committed by an individual perpetrator 
can constitute a crime against humanity if it occurs within the context of 
a broader campaign”).  
180. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 34 n. 68.  
181. Id. at 34.  
182. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 162.  
183. Jean-Christophe Peuch, Afghanistan: Taliban Edict Threatens Central 
Asian Cultural Heritage, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 1, 
2001) https://www.rferl.org/a/1095862.html [https://perma.cc/29H5-
HRXF] (ordering the elimination of all non-Islamic statues and 
sanctuaries from Afghanistan).  
184. See Newton & Scharf, supra 41, at 273 (discussing the widespread or 
systematic requirement and mentioning in that regard the 1998 Fatwa 
issued by Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders declaring their objective 
to kill Americans and their allies).  
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humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.”185 
This, however, does not render that only conducts targeting the 
physical well-being of humans are criminalized. Rather, the expression 
should be construed broadly to also include acts such as destruction of 
property (cultural or other) that cause severe harm to civilian 
population. That interpretation is consistent with the case-law 
regarding the crime of persecution, as well as with the general goal of 
Article 2 to protect “humanity” and not only “humans.”186 The 
reference to any civilian population also calls for a broad interpretation: 
The term civilian should be understood as including persons of any 
nationality.187 With the exception of the crime of persecution, there is 
also no need to demonstrate a discriminatory intent; it suffices that a 
multiplicity of victims exists.188 It is therefore submitted that the phrase 
‘any civilian population’ may include not only an identifiable group 
such as the residents of a town (e.g. those of Timbuktu) or members of 
a religious groups (e.g. Buddhists around the world affected by the 
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas) but also more generally the 
international community as a whole. The ICC’s recognition of the fact 
that the international community may be considered as a victim further 
supports this interpretation.    
Thirdly, the perpetrator must have had ‘knowledge of the attack.’ 
This requirement constitutes an additional mental element to be 
distinguished from the specific mens rea requirement of each crime. It 
entails that the perpetrator must commit the acts with knowledge of 
the broader widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population. 
It is unnecessary, however, to prove that “the perpetrator had 
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of 
the plan or policy of the State or organization.”189 Furthermore, the 
personal motive of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack is 
 
185.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 421 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).  
186. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7; Draft Convention, supra note 12, 
art. 2.  
187. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 174–75 (explaining that “crimes against 
humanity cover a broader range of potential victims than war crimes” 
and “it is unnecessary to demonstrate that the victims are linked to any 
particular side in the attack against the civilian population”). See also 
Cassesse, supra note 31, at 354 (explaining that “any civilian population” 
means “any group of civilians whatever their nationality”).  
188. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 173.   
189. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, 6 (2011), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf; See also Draft 
Convention, supra note 12, at 42.  
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irrelevant; the perpetrator does not need to share the purpose or goal 
of the broader attack.190 Thus, in relation to deliberate attacks against 
cultural heritage such as those witnessed in Afghanistan, Syria, and 
Mali, there would be no need to establish that a defendant who was a 
member of the groups that committed the attacks had profound 
understanding of the religious edict that served as a basis for the 
widespread destruction or was privy to the detailed plans of the attacks; 
it would suffice to establish that the individual concerned was aware 
that his or her conduct was part of a general campaign targeting 
cultural heritage.      
B. The Specific Material Element 
An important distinction between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is that the former may criminalize certain conduct regardless 
of their outcome.191 In contrast, crimes against humanity as currently 
listed under the Rome Statute and the Draft Convention require, as 
part of the material element, damage or harm to be inflicted (through 
extermination, enslavement, sexual violence, etc.).192 Furthermore, the 
nature of the crimes listed in Article 2 of the Draft Convention renders 
that the harm inflicted is to be severe.193 Hence, the new proposed crime 
will also require actual and acute damage, although it is not required 
that the damage caused be total or irreversible. 
C. The Specific Mental Element 
The specific mental elements of the new proposed crime against 
humanity, namely the awareness of the factual circumstances that 
established the status of the target (protected cultural heritage) and 
the intention to severely damage it, are consistent with the approach 
 
190. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 43.  
191. Id. at 7 (criminalizing the act of intentionally directing an attack against 
protected property such as historic monuments in arts. 8)(2)(b)(iv) & 
(ix); causing damage to the targeted property is not required.)  
192. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7; see Draft Convention, supra note 12, 
at 13. But see id. at 14 (outlining a general exception to that requirement 
is found in the criminalization of an attempt to commit a crime against 
humanity; hence, a fruitless attack may be considered as an attempt to 
cause destruction of cultural heritage that yields individual criminal 
responsibility).  
193. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 28 (“imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law”); id. (“other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health”); id. at 29 (“‘persecution’ means the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”) 
(emphasis added).  
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found in several existing crimes against humanity.194 The requirement 
to show intent also corresponds to international instruments governing 
the field of cultural heritage.195 The knowledge and intent could be 
inferred from evidence such as the deliberate attack on a heritage site 
carrying a protective emblem.196 
In exceptional circumstances, a governmental or organizational 
policy that deliberately fails to take actions may be considered an 
attack amounting to a crime against humanity, although the existence 
of such a policy “cannot be inferred solely from the absence of 
governmental or organizational action.’197 Accordingly, neglecting a 
historic monument or an archeological site is unlikely to yield criminal 
responsibility under the Draft Convention. Conversely, if governmental 
officials purposely ignore ongoing attacks against protected heritage 
while possessing the means to be aware of these attacks and the ability 
to take appropriate steps to prevent the attacks and punish the 
perpetrators, they may be held responsible for their inaction.198 
 
194. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(e)t 28 (criminalizing 
“[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law.”) The elements of the crime as 
defined in relation to the corresponding crime under the Rome Statute 
require the perpetrator to be aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 189, at 6.  
195. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8 (the war crime of attacking cultural 
heritage such as historic monuments, requires the prosecutor to show that 
the perpetrator “intentionally directed an attack” against the protected 
heritage); See also 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15 (enumerating the 
offences considered as serious violations of the Protocol, and which refers 
to offences committed “intentionally”); G.A. Res. 46/49 (Aug. 6, 1992) 
(using the phrase “intentional destruction,” defined by the Declaration as 
“an act intended to destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage . . . .”); 
1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 6 (imposing on State Parties the 
duty not to take deliberate measures which might damage cultural 
heritage in another state) (emphasis added).  
196. For example, in Prosecutor v. Strugar, the intent to deliberately destroy 
cultural property—the required mens rea for convictions under Article 
3(d) of the ICTY Statute, which is similar to the mental element of the 
proposed new crime against humanity—was inferred from: (1) the 
evidence of the deliberate attack on the Old Town of Dubrovnik; (2) the 
renown cultural and historical character of that property as a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site; and (3) the fact that protective UNESCO emblems 
were visible to the attackers of the property.  Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case 
No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 329 (Jan. 31, 2005). 
197. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 
189, at 6, n.6.  
198. ROY S. LEE & HAKAN FRIMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 76 (2001).  
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D. Definition of ‘Cultural Heritage’ 
If a new crime against humanity is added in the Draft Convention, 
it would be recommended to also introduce a definition of the term 
‘cultural heritage’ for the purposes of the Draft Convention. This would 
correspond to the structure of Article 2 of the Draft Convention (and 
similarly of Article 7 of the Rome Statute), which include definitions of 
key terms of crimes.199 In addition, as a newly introduced crime it would 
be advisable to provide as much precision as possible.  
The task of defining ‘cultural heritage’, however, is not without 
challenges. The definitions of ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘cultural property’ 
are complex, having evolved over the years and differing from one 
contemporary legal source to another.200 Different methodologies have 
been used in different legal instruments. Thus, for example, crimes 
reflecting IHL norms such as those introduced as war crimes in the 
Rome Statute, do not make any reference to the terms ‘cultural 
heritage’ or ‘cultural property’.201 Moreover, they are often based on 
the purpose of the protected immovable property (e.g. “buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes”202) rather 
than on its cultural value.  
A different methodology is reflected in the Cambodian 
Extraordinary Chambers Statute, which neither provided its own 
definition of the crime nor of the term ‘cultural heritage’; instead, it 
included in the list of crimes subject to the Chambers’ jurisdiction the 
crime of destruction of cultural property during armed conflict pursuant 
to the 1954 Hague Convention.203 A similar approach was applied in 
 
199. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2); Draft Convention, supra note 
12, art. 2(2).   
200. A different definition of cultural property or heritage is found in several 
major international Conventions regulating that field, including the 1954 
Convention, the 1970 Convention, and the 1972 Convention. See 1954 
Convention, supra note 24, art.1; 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 8; 
1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1. 
201. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8. 
202. 1907 Convention, supra note 117, art. 27. See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 13, art. 8(b)(ix).  
203. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers 
Statute,” art. 7 (“The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to 
bring to trial all Suspects most responsible for the destruction of cultural 
property during armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention 
for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and 
which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 
1979.”). Limiting jurisdiction to destruction carried out in violation of the 
1954 Convention may pose difficulties to the prosecution if acts of 
destruction committed by the Khmer Rouge regime would not be 
considered as being committed during an armed conflict. Agreement 
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the more recent Nicosia Convention, which, in relation to moveable 
property, borrowed the definition of ‘cultural property’ from the 1970 
Convention.204 While this definition is rather detailed and as such can 
provide clarity, it also has its shortcomings. It covers only tangible 
heritage and as a closed-list definition it does not allow for the inclusion 
of forms or types of cultural heritage that are currently unknown or not 
yet considered worthy of protection. In addition, for the purpose of the 
1970 and Nicosia Conventions, the granting of protected status entirely 
depends on its designation as protected heritage by States,205 thereby 
excluding heritage that has not yet been expressly designated as such.  
One method which may provide the utmost clarity is to cover in 
the definition introduced in the Draft Convention only cultural heritage 
that has been listed in accordance with the mechanisms of existing 
conventions in the field. This will include world heritage recognized 
under the 1972 Convention and the 2003 Intangible Heritage 
Convention, as well as cultural heritage listed as benefitting from 
special protection under the 1954 Convention or enhanced protection 
under the 1999 Protocol.206  
There are, however, inherent difficulties associated with those lists. 
Similarly to the abovementioned point on the definitions of the 1970 
and the Nicosia Conventions, the process of listing is completely 
dependent on States’ willingness to propose certain cultural heritage for 
inscription on the lists. Moreover, the current lists do not truly reflect 
cultural diversity. For example, with regard to the World Heritage List 
of the 1972 Convention, it has been contended that the List manifests 
a bias in favor of some regions, notably Europe, the great prehistoric 
civilizations of Latin America, and a number of Asian cultures, in 
particular those of India and China. Cultural heritage of other regions 
such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean scarcely figure on the 
 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 7, U.N.-Camb., June 6, 
2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.  
204. Nicosia Convention, supra note 36, art. 2(b). With regard to immovable 
property, the Nicosia Convention used the classification of the 1972 
Convention, namely monuments, groups of buildings, and sites. See 1972 
Convention, supra note 71, art. 1.  
205. See 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1  (requiring  the protected 
property to be “specifically designated” by State Parties); 1972 
Convention, supra note 71, art. 2 (requiring the protected moveable 
property to be “classified, defined or specifically designated by any Party 
to this Convention or to the 1970 UNESCO Convention,” and protecting 
immovable property to be “defined or specifically designated by any Party 
to this Convention or to the 1970 Convention”).  
206. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 6(3); Intangible Heritage 
Convention, supra note 133, art. 3; 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art. 
8; 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15.  
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity 
327 
List.207 Additionally, certain types of cultural property are 
disproportionately represented on the List, in particular European 
historic towns, Christian places of worship, and archaeological sites 
(especially those of ancient Greece and Rome).208 It is also noteworthy 
that the 1972 Convention explicitly indicates that non-inscription of 
sites on the World Heritage List does not mean that they do not have 
an outstanding universal value worthy of protection.209 The Bamiyan 
Buddhas and the Old Bridge of Mostar are just two examples of sites 
that were not listed, at the time of their destruction, on the World 
Heritage List, but would have likely met the ‘outstanding universal 
value’ test of the 1972 Convention.210 
In light of the above mentioned considerations, it is proposed to 
introduce a definition which meets the following conditions: Firstly, the 
definition ought to be broad enough to include various forms of existing 
and potential future types of cultural heritage.211 Hence, it is 
recommended to phrase the definition in general terms, preferably with 
several illustrative examples in the commentary to the Draft 
Convention, rather than to lay out an exhaustive list of types of 
 
207. Raechel Anglin, The World Heritage List: Bridging the Cultural Property 
Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 241, 251 
n.58 (2008). 
208. Sophie Starrenburg, Who is the Victim of Cultural Heritage Destruction? 
The Reparations Order in the Case of the Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi 
Al Mahdi, BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. (Aug. 25, 2017) 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-the-victim-of-cultural-heritage-
destruction-the-reparations-order-in-the-case-of-the-prosecutor-v-ahmad-
al-faqi-al-mahdi/ [https://perma.cc/4V5X-KHLZ] (“[T]he listing process 
at UNESCO has been viewed as notoriously politicised and biased towards 
particular forms of heritage. The World Heritage List is by no means a 
perfect mirror of the most important cultural sites across the globe, and 
should be acknowledged as a work in progress.”).  
209. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 12 (“The fact that a property has 
not been included in either of the [World Heritage List or the list of World 
Heritage in Danger] shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not 
have an outstanding universal value for purposes other than those 
resulting from inclusion in these lists.”) 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra 
note 69, §§ VI, VII (addressing intentional destruction of cultural heritage 
of great importance for humanity “whether or not it is inscribed on a list 
maintained by UNESCO or another international organization”).   
210. World Heritage List, Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of 
the Bamiyan Valley, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208/ 
[https://perma.cc/S29E-MW75]; World Heritage List, Old Bridge Area of 
the Old City of Mostar, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/946/ 
[https://perma.cc/DP7U-WC6Q].  
211. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Cultural 
Rights, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/71/317 (Aug. 9, 2016) (noting that the concepts 
of cultural property and cultural heritage “should be understood in broad, 
holistic terms”).    
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heritage as was done in the 1970 Convention.212 Further, for the reasons 
previously noted, the definition should not be contingent upon listing 
under existing conventions or on explicit designation by States. Such 
listing or designation can certainly support a court’s assessment of the 
cultural value of the heritage targeted, the defendant’s mens rea at the 
time of the attack, or the aggravating factors for the purpose of 
sentencing. Thus, for example, if the heritage targeted was listed at the 
time of the attack under the 1972 Convention, it should be presumed 
to fall within the definition of ‘cultural heritage’; yet, listing should not 
a prerequisite for prosecution under the Draft Convention.  
It is also recommended to include intangible heritage within the 
definition to ensure the protection of a variety of important cultural 
forms such as oral traditions, performing arts, and social rituals.213 This 
will not only reflect developments that occurred in recent decades such 
as the conclusion of the Intangible Heritage and the Cultural Diversity 
Conventions, but would also serve as a step towards the harmonization 
of the different legal regimes currently governing intangible and 
tangible cultural heritage, a prominent objective advocated for by 
UNESCO.214  
The test for determining cultural heritage as such ought to be based 
on the cultural value test, which is applied - although with variations - 
in the definitions of cultural heritage or cultural property found in 
several international conventions.215 It provides better protection than 
 
212. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1.   
213. See Intangible Heritage Convention, supra note 133, art. 2 (providing a 
definition of intangible cultural heritage).  
214. For example, at 2004 a symposium entitled “Safeguarding of Tangible and 
Intangible Cultural Heritage: Toward an Integrated Approach,” the then-
Director-General of UNESCO, Koichiro Matsuura, highlighted the need 
“to pay attention to the totality of cultural heritage of nations and 
communities so that protection measures are not only adapted to each 
component but also mutually supportive where possible.” In that regard, 
he added, the development of cooperation between the two major 
UNESCO Conventions dealing with the protection and safeguarding of 
the tangible and intangible heritage will be of outmost importance. He 
reiterated, “the need for the harmonization of definitions and for the 
development of a consistent set of heritage policies,” and concluded his 
remarks by stating that “a new, inclusive and, where appropriate, unified 
vision of heritage” and “an integrated approach, which respects the 
diversity of cultures and which acknowledges the interdependencies of 
tangible and intangible heritages as well as their autonomy, will have to 
be studied and translated into concrete measures of implementation.” 
Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage: Toward an 
Integrated Approach, UNESCO (Oct. 20, 2004) 
https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/89 [https://perma.cc/5ZP9-3WPS]  
215. See 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art.1 (defining cultural property as 
“movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural 
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the “purpose test” of the 1907 Convention and the Rome Statute, since 
it does not depend on the specific purpose for which protected objects 
and sites were used at the time they were attacked.216 The cultural 
value test also rises above - and thus avoids - other general or legal 
characterizations of heritage – e.g. its use for secular or religious 
purposes - which are irrelevant for the sake of protection.  
With regard to the threshold to be defined by the cultural value 
test it is proposed to use the terminology of the 1954 Convention, 
namely to set the bar at the level of heritage of ‘great importance to 
every people’.217 This will ensure consistency with the applicable test 
under IHL and will provide sufficient protection to various forms of 
cultural heritage whose value transcends geographical boundaries,218 
while excluding those whose value is disputable.  
Based on the discussion thus far, the proposed definition of the 
term ‘cultural heritage’ will read as follows: “Human-made creation219 
of great importance to every people, irrespective of its origin, ownership 
or the purposes for which it is used, its territorial or geographical 
location, its tangible or intangible nature, or whether it is movable or 
immovable.”220 
VI. Conclusion 
Since the genesis of the concept of crimes against humanity, the 
crimes as defined under international law focused not on the single 
criminal act against the direct victim, but rather on the repercussions 
 
heritage of every people”); 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 1 
(referring to heritage as “outstanding universal value”).   
216. 1907 Convention, supra note 117, art. 27. See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 13, art. 8(b)(ix). 
217. 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art. 1. 
218. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 91 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Brammertz et al., 
supra note 21, at 1153; Wangkeo, supra note 4 at 188 (explaining the 
distinction between heritage that transcends geographical boundaries, on 
the one hand, and national patrimony on the other hand).  
219. The reference to “human-made creation” is meant to distinguish between 
cultural and natural heritage. Though both deserve protection – as 
manifested by the 1972 Convention which covers both types of heritage – 
there have been few, if any, acts committed against natural heritage in 
an “iconoclastic” manner, namely for the sake of destroying natural sites 
as such and convey a message within the act of destruction. Addressing 
acts committed against cultural heritage therefore appears to be more 
acute. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4. This does not exclude any 
future debate on criminalization of environmental wrongs as a distinct 
crime against humanity, as suggested by Wattad. See generally Wattad, 
supra note 59.  
220. Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 895. 
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of such acts on humankind. The preamble of the Draft Convention and 
similarly that of the Rome Statute reflect this approach by making a 
reference to crimes “that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”221 
Cultural heritage is an integral component of humanity. As 
numerous statements pronounced on the international level have 
manifested, deliberate attacks against heritage have direct and lasting 
impact on the world community as a whole. Beyond those statements, 
various developments in recent decades – notably, since the 1990’s when 
the Rome Statute was negotiated - attest to the growing recognition of 
the importance of preserving heritage for present and future 
generations.  
The current legal regime under ICL, however, has not followed suit. 
Introducing a distinct crime against humanity in the Draft Convention 
can bridge this gap and enhance the rule of law by countering 
radicalization and assist in preventing irreversible damage to the shared 
heritage of humanity.  
Considering that attacks against cultural heritage have already 
been recognized as serious crimes under international law, albeit, as 
explained in this article, with certain shortcomings, adding a new crime 
against humanity should not be perceived as a groundbreaking 
departure from the established framework of ICL. To the contrary, it 
would be a natural continuation of the developments in this field, 
indeed one which is overdue.  
 
 
221. Draft Convention, supra note 12, preamble; Rome Statute, supra note 13, 
preamble,  
